The British Bomber Since 1914 (Repost)

Whatever verdict historians and moral­ists of the distant future, no longer con­strained by personal experience and familiarity, consider appropriate on the bombing aeroplane of the twentieth century, one fact is incontestable: it represented the most powerful weapon in the arsenals of the belligerent nations in two World Wars, potentially decisive in the first and demonstrably so in the second. Despite being conceived in times of international tranquility, the flying machine was inevitably doomed to be­come a weapon of war, for such is the short-sighted ingenuity of mankind — whatever the motives, be they aggres­sion or survival in the face of it. Inter­national war may be the result of failed diplomacy, but it is also a product of human greed and the fear of uncon­trolled tyranny. Unfortunately wars in the twentieth century have become a reality too quickly for any genuine understanding to be gained of the ulti­mate cost in human life, and the break­up of social structures they engender. During the lifespan of the bombing aeroplane even the accepted rules of warfare, for so long observed to a greater or lesser degree, were almost wholly abandoned. The assumed ability of the bomber to deliver a decisive attack has rendered obsolete the traditional decla­ration of war, for such a declaration would not only eliminate the essential element of surprise but would invite pre-emptive action — itself potentially decisive. Central to the principle of aerial bom­bardment was the Douhet doctrine, an uncompromising strategic philosophy expressed after the end of the First World War by the Italian, General Giulio Douhet (1869-1930): that with the advent of air power the bomber is all-powerful, against which there is no sure defence, and that, this being so, the traditional arms can provide only a screen.