"Rationalizing Parliament. Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France" by John D. Huber

This book examines how institutional arrangements in the French Constitution shape the bargaining strategies of political parties. The study reveals important similarities between legislative politics in the United States and in parliamentary systems and the shortcomings in conventional interpretations of French institutional arrangements.

Professor Huber investigates the decision by French elites to include in the Constitution legislative procedures intended to "rationalize" the policy-making role of parliament and analyzes the impact of these procedures on policy outcomes, cabinet stability, and political accountability.

• Reinterprets French political system
• Demonstrates different roles played by rational choice models in the study of legislatures

Contents
Series editors' preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 Parliamentary government in the Fifth Republic
2 Choosing institutions
3 Restrictive procedures and policy conflict
4 Restrictive procedures and bargaining among parties
5 The confidence vote procedure and electoral politics
6 Electoral politics, procedural choice, and the French budget
7 Institutional arrangements, political parties, and parliamentary democracy
Notes
References
Index